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Abstract
Nigeria's balance of payment's position has been adverse since
1981 exerting severe pressure on her foreign exchange position., .
Nigeria has used a combination of exchange controls and fiscal and
monetary policy measures to restrict the high import propensity of
Nigerians which has resulted in the persistent external disequili.
brium. These measures though severe have not been adequate to
correct the external imbalance. In the interim Nigeria's trade debts
have mounted and her credit wortniness plummeted. Goods can no
longer flow as before. Since the nation's industrialisation efforts
are geared towards refining foreign raw materials with very low
domestic value added.. her industries are closing down and
empioyment position getting worse. It is the contention of this
paper that an I.M.F. package would help restructure the economy
through its hackneyed conditionalities and provide relief for the
revitalization of the nation's industries, increase employment and
reduce socio-economic problems. Though Nigeria had rejected the
loan, it is still of academic interest. The creation of a 2nd tier
foreign exchange market and Nigeria's request for I.M.F. approval
of her structural adjustment programmes could substitute for the
I.M.F. loan and achieve almost the same results.
Introduction
Nigeria has suffered from balance of payments disequilibria
since 1981. In consequence, the nation's foreign exchange reserv~
are seriously drawn to accommodate the high import propensity of
N.igerians and the resulting burgeoning deficits in the balance of
payments. Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves fell from a high
figure of N7 billion in 1981 to below N1 billion in 1982, a figure
hardly adequate to finance two months import bill, a position
dangerously below the minimum range of four months import bill
prescribed by the I.M.F.
In order to reduce the high propensity to import, Nigeria
introduced more comprehensive exchange control measures under
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the Economic Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1982. A
coinprehenslve excflange control measure was adopted with the
objective of reducing the country's foreign exchange expenditure to
alevel that would be compatible with her reduced foreign exchange
capacity.
Furtner the famous world oil glut had hit the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) of which Nigeria is a
member, who accordingly reduced production. Since not much
could be done to rapidly expand foreign exchange receipts in the
short run, at ention was therefore focussed on curtailing the
outflow of foreign exchange. To this end, a combination of fiscal
and monetary policy measures were initiated by the Federal
Government.
In 1983, some of the measures applicable in the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1982 were retained and strengthened. This was
so because the economic prospects for the country in 1983 were
expected to be worse than what obtained in 1982. In 1984 a more
stringent exchange control measure was promulgated by the Buhari
Military Government with a view to revamp the battered economy
which was due to the unsatisfactory administration of exchange
control measures by the previous government.
Some of the measures embodied in these various acts of
Government included reduction in Basic Travelling Allowance
(B.T.A.) from N800 per individual to NlOO, the prohibition of
certain goods from importation, the placing of goods on specific
import licence from open general licence, the imposition of com-
pufsory advance deposit for imports and the Nl00 foreign travel
levy.
The compulsory advance deposit for imports was part of
exchange control regulations to curtail imports. Some of the items
and their percentage deposits are as shown in Table 1 below. The
deposits were against imports and were timed to reduce liquidity in
the system as well as reducing the high import propensity of
Nigerians. The amounts were deposited with the Ceatral Bank of
Nigeria by the coliectihg banks at zero interest rates.
These measures were not adequate to solve Nigeria's balance of
payments problems. The deficits in the balance of payments
continued until 1984 when a slight surplus was earned as a result of
very restrictive foreign exchange budgeting.
The Federal Government was negotiating a loan of N2.2 billion
from the lnternationa Monetary Fund to help defray the nation's
outstanding short-term obligations with trade creditors and restore
trading relations which had been harmstrung by the nation's
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Table 1
Compulsor~D Advance Deposits
Items
Raw Materials
Spare parts
Building Materials
Capital Goods and Books
Motor Vehicles and Trucks
Motor Cars
Other Goods
Percentage Deposits for
Imports
25%
25070
50070
50070
200070
250070
2500-/0
Source: Ccnlral Bank of Nigeria, Monerar)' Policy Circular I, 1982,
reduced payment capacity. The I.M.F. had given Nigeria certain
conditions to be fulfiled before granting her the loan. These condi-
tions are referred to as l.M.F. conditionalities. It is noteworthy
that Nigeria has accepted in principle and implemented to some
extent the following fifteen conditionalities:
1. Rcduction in the aggregate public expenditun:, particularly in
the size of the Budget deficit.
2. Introduction of greater budgetary discipline.
3. Review of ongoing projects with a view to determining their
priorities.
4. Reduction in grants, subventions and loans to paraslatals.
5. Classification of parastatals into "social" and "ecollomic"
activities for purposes of restructuring them to achll':\ c cost-
effectiveness, accountability and for economic parastalals
profitability.
6. Stoppage of non-statutory transfers to State ('oVl:rnIllell[s.
7, Simplification and rationalization of customs tariffs.
8, Upward review of interest rates and reduction in the sectoral
alluL<.lllUl1UI cretli~K
9. Phased removal of sub.s,idies on fertilizers.
10. Vigorous export drive to'broaden the export base,
II. Review of industrial incentives and policy and the abohtion of
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Approved User Scheme.
12. Adjustment of Producer Prices of agricultural commodities.
13. Strict external debt control and management.
14. Improvement in operational efficiency of revenue collection
agencies such as Departments of Customs and Excise and
Inland Revenue.
15. The withdrawal of subsidies on petroleum products.
The yet unaccepted conditionalities include the following two:
1. The devaluation of the naira currency, or exchange rate
adjustment by about 25-:]06]0 initially followed by further
adjustments until the element of over-valuation is eliminated.
2. The liberalization of trade.
The above CllIHlilion;, an~ fclt to be too severe and against the
interest of the country. It is argued that the liberalization of trade
would lead to the dumping of all sorts of foreign goods in Nigeria
and the witfldrawal of petroleum subsidies would increase
transport costs and have cummulative upward impact on all prices.
It is al:;o argued that devaluation could worsen our balance of
payments position since our major export is oil whose quota is
externally allocated through OPEC. Let us look at these areas of
disagreement and their likely implications.
Devaluation of the Naira Currency
Devaluation is a monetary technique applied by a country under
temporary economic rcce:ision for the correction of imbalance in
the external accounts of a devaluing country to improve the
country's balance of payments positiQn. When a country devalues,
she gains in foreign currency in two ways: I (i) She could now supply
at relatively cheaper rate to the home market those commodities
she has to import. Her marginal propensity to import goes down.
Then sht: savcs an amount in foreign exchange equal to the increase
in turnover in the home market. The imbalance in the external
account may be cmrected from the savings accruing from this. (ii)
By a country devaluing her currency in terms of other national
currencies a country which has suffered reverses in her balance of
payments cheapens her export goods and becomes more competi-
tive. Forcign exchange is gained at the expense of competing
countrlc·. 11m call II -\ correct the internal imbalance.
On the argument that Nigeria still exports only oil, foreign
exchange can still be saved through reduction in imports and the
substitution of domestic production whieh devaluation makes
lOS
possIble. Also in the Nigerian situation export expansion is still
valia when viewed in a dynamic sense. In the first instance our oil
export quota is not generally fulfilled and in consequence shortfalls
are realised in our oil exports as against permissible limits. In the
second' instance, our agricultural products would become com-
petitive with devaluation and we can now export some of these
commodities as before. For instance an Abakaliki rice producer
can produce at about N90 per 50 kilogram bag, but foreign
produced rice arrives Lagos at landed cost of about N40 per
kilogram bag. This means that importers can reap excess profits by
importing rice at low foreign prices and selling at high Nigerian
market prices. If naira is sufficiently devalued that 50 kilogram bag
of rice can land in Lagos at say NlOO, this would be a boom to
Nigerian producers. Alternatively the banning of importation of
rice achieves the same result, but Nigeria cannol ban importation
of all commodities as the inflationary consequences can be too
explosive and capable of bringing down any government.
The Central Bank of Nigeria was entrusted with the responsi-
bility of management of the nation's external reserves. One
important aspect of it is the determination of the naira exchange
rate. This is based mostly on the currencies of Nigeria's major
trading partners, the Central Bank's imparl weighted basket of
currencies. The currencies comprise U.S. dollar, pound sterling,
deutschmark, Japanese yen, French franc, Swissfranc, and Dutch
Guilder.
Before 1978, the Central Bank of Nigeria held its reserve assets
only in the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York in the U.S. As a result. the naira exchange rate was tied to the
U.S. dollar and the British pound sterling movement in the inter-
national money market. Since 1978, a basket of currencies
approach similar to the International Monetary Fund system of
valuation of the Special Drawing Rights (S.D.Rs) is used in the
determination of the exchange rate of the naira. Like the S.D.Rs.,
this involves the Central Bank's monitoring of the movement of the
exchange values of the currencies of all Nigeria's major trading
partners daily. Based on these, the Central Bank of Nigeria
estimates the naira exchange rate on a day-to-day basis.
Since the naira is not a convertible or trading currency, its value
with respect to other currencies cannot be determined by its supply
and demand in the international market, as such, only estimates can
be made. The method of estimation by the Central Bank of Nigeria
has tended to over-value the naira. The black market rale for the
naira viz-a-viz foreign international traded currencies is considera-
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bly lower than official rates. This over-valuation has tended to put
premium on imports which are relatively cheaper and to discount
export-baseo activities because of Nigeria's uncompetitive position
as a result of high production costs. Thus the nation's external
imbalance could exacerbate if naira does not depreciate.
Some African countries in recent years devalued in order to
expand trade. In 1975, Tanzania devalued her currency by 15010 and
pegged it to the I.M.F. Special Drawing Rights. Again in January
1979, Tanzania devalued by 10010 and delinked her shilling from the
S.D.R. and pegged it to the basket of currencies of Tanzania's
major trading partners. The main reason for these was that as
Tanzania's economic hardship escalated she sought for I.M.F. loan
to boost her exports. Devaluation was one of the conditionalities.2
Zaire also devalued her currency by 33010 in 1978 and in 1979 by
another 25010 during its talk with the I.M.F. in Paris. The devalua-
tion was demanded by the I.M.F. as the condition for standby
credit of $153 million. The strategy was to lessen the strain on
Zaire's balance of payments which had been in deficit in the
preceding years. 3 Zambia devalued her currency (Kwacha) by 20010
in 1978. Later, the currency was further devalued by 1000J0 in a
period of four years. 4 The devaluation was sequel to the I.M.F.
conditions before Zambia could borrow to facilitate increased
exports and revamp her sagging economy. Sudan devalued by 20010
in 1978. Again in 1984 the commercial value of the Sudanese pound
was devalued by 14.3GJo. Official reason for devaluation was to
encourage exports and to boost remittances frpm her citizens
working abroad mainly in oil rich Ar~b countries. 5
Ghana in 1978 devalued the Cedi by 140%. Supporters of this
devaluation held that foreign exchange earnings fr:.lm Ghana's
major exports was not enough to pay for her import~K To them
devaluation would reduce importation, stimulate dlrKg~<;tic
production and increase Government revenue. fi Ghana again in
1983 explicitly devalued the Cedi by an astronomic 990% (nine
hundred and ninety percent) which is recorded as the highest
devaluation by any country since World War II.
According to Carver, the devaluation was an indirect
devaluation of the Cedi. He stressed that the I.M.F. reluctantly
accepted a system of multiple exchange rate proposed by Ghana,
whereby a bonus IS paid toexpOllc:TS ana slircharge leVlea un
imports. The effect being a devaluation of the Cedi as regards
physical commodities while invisible and capital transactions
continued at the official rate. 7
Other developing countries that have devalued recently include
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Sierra Leone, Togo, Ivory Coast, Argentina, etc. Nigeria has
serious balance of payments problems like anyone of these
countries. Yet she has refused to devalue to help boost her exports
and reduce imports. Most countries listed above who devalued are
like Nigeria, mono-product economies, but they embarked on this
course to improve their balance of payments position. One may
ask if these smaller poorer countries, why not Nigeria? The
salutory impact of Nigeria's first and only official devaluation of
10070 in 1973 should encourage further such actions to realign her
over-valued naira and increase her balance of payments position. 8
Prices may actually fall with devaluation. The market prices of
imported goods presently reflect the black market value of the
naira. Any commodity that could be bought at say NI,OOO in I) IC
salt:~ 10i N3,OOO and above in Nigenan markets. The 200070 uver
valuation of the naira is already reflected in Nigerian market prices
of foreign produced goods. If traders can get foreign exchange at
otficially devalued rates ot 100070 to procure foreign produced
goods, the price of the above goods would be N2,OOO and not
~PIlllK Thus devaluation with less restrictive exchange control
measures could reduce prices and not necessarily increase them.
On the contention that debt service burden would increase with
devaluation, it is hereby submilted fhat this would even fall. With
the rescheduling of debt repayments, the Durden of debt servicing
as a percentage of exports would fall. Further the debts are
denominated in dollars and not naira, although the naira value of
debts would increase with devaluation, but the actual payment in
dollars stays the same. Just as the ,jaira values of the debts increase,
the naira value of the foreign t".:hange proceeds from exports
increases. Both should nullify each others adverse effect.
Trade Liberalization
Trade Liberalization does not mean that the nation's borders
would be open for the dumping of all foreign goods. Our tariff
structure is very high and could be reviewed downwards in order to
reduce the potential inflationary impact of devaluation. Further
with devaluation, foreign goods become more expensive and
according to a fundamental economic law, the higher the price, the
less the demand. Less foreign goods would be demanded and this
WOUld be an adultlonal constraillt 011 foreigll exchange disburse-
ment.
Nigeria has rightly abolished the Advancl" Deposit Scheme and
decentralized Form M approvals. Nigeria should go ahead to
gradually eliminate prohibition of certain goods since their high
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prices would constrain their demand. The area of trade
liberalization is an area for skilled negotiation in the interest of the
nation. Nigeria should still retain the right of foreign exchange
budgeting through the use of import licences in order not to
exacerbate the balance of payments position. But the rush for
imports would attenuate if the naira finds its true international
value as the high profit rip-off from importing goods and selling at
fantastic markups would disappear. .
Withdrawal of Subsidies
This could be inflationary since transport costs would escalate.
But this would lead to less unnecessary trips and lowered accident
rates. It would lead to modernization of our telephone services and
elimination of waste in consumption of fuel. In order to mitigate
the inflationary consequences of this conditionality it is necessary
for a phased removal over the span of the Extended Funds Facility.
Nigeria's petroleum products are cheaper because of the subsidy
and this gives vent to untoward practices like bunkering and
smuggling of refined crude to neighbouring countries to be sold at
high prices. These untoward practices would stop. Government can
then earn more revenue for other development projects. Also to
mitigate the impact on fixed income receivers like civil servants,
Government can raise salaries as was done in Ghana. Nigeria is ripe
for a comprehensive salary review since the Udoji Williams exercise
of 1974175, a decade of increasing prices and stagnant incomes. In
1986, 8,0010 petroleum subsidy was withdrawn but public sector
salary review has not yet been made.
Rescheduling of Trade Arrears
It was said that the major obstacle in the rescheduling of the
trade arrears is the refusal of the Export Credit Agencies (0 re-
schedule their insured trade arrears of about N2 billion unless
Nigeria reached agreement with I.M.F. This is the normal practice
in official multilateral rescheduling process requiring the participa-
tion and concordance of the I.M.F. amongst other agencies before
agreements are struck. Official debt rescheduling are negotiatec1
through aid consortia or through credit clubs like the Paris club.
So this is not a conspiracy against Nigeria as some Nigerian
critics are wont to say. It is a normal practice. For instance the
Paris Club came into being in 1956 when a number of European
countries met to renegotiate outstanding balances in their bilateral
accounts with Argentina. Since then it has become an official
forum for renegotiating debt. It brings i;lS many creditors as are
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willing to participate together. The meeting is attended by
observers from World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OEeD
and UNCTAD.
The I.M.F. representative at the meeting presents an assessment
of the country's economic situation and prospects including the
country's relationship with the Fund. The World Bank representa·
tive presents a longer term analysis of the debtors economic
prospects. This is then followed by the creditor's representatives
and an understanding on the general terms of rescheduling of the
country's debt is reached.
If Nigeria had taken the I.M.F. loan and negotiated the
conditionalities in the best interest of the nation, this would have
been the basis for debt rescheduling with her creditor nations. The
agreements with the trade creditors would normally include the
following:
(a) It should involve loans granted or guaranteed by official
agencies of participating creditor countries. In Nigeria's case,
the insured trade arrears of N2 billion with the British Export
Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) qualifies for
rescheduling.
(b) Nigeria would have to have in force a stabilization pro-
gramme with the I.M.F. And this is mandatory before reo
scheduling provision becomes effective.
(c) Nigeria must reschedule between 85010 and 90% of the debt
falling due i.e. the N2 billion, and allow for a grace period of
five years with a repayment to a further period of up to five
years. The non-rescheduled portion should be paid during the
grace period.
(d) All short-term debts and debts rescheduled before must be
excluded.
Nigeria would have rescheduled her debts conveniently after the
I.M.F. loan must have been concluded. The I.M.F. loan would
have refinanced the short-term trade arrears amounting to N2.6
billion.
The Case for the I.M.F. Loan
By 1977, Nigeria's total foreign indebtedne<;s was N365.1
million, a very lOW figure. Hy 1~lpP Nigeria's total foreign
indebtedness grew to NIO.893 billion9. The distribution of Nigeria's
external debt, state and federal governments as at the end of 1983 is
as shown in Table 2 below.
Nigeria's total external debt increased by 16% in 1979, by 1981
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Table 2
External Debt of State and Federal Governments
as at 30th De-;ember, 1983 (N 'M)
Federal Goyernment (Total)
Refinancing Credit
Other Loans
State Goyernment (fotal)
Anambra
Bauchi
Bendel
Benue
Borno
Cross River
Gongola
Imo
Kano
Kaduna
Kwara
Lagos
Niger
Ogun
Ondo
Oyo
Plateau
Rivers
Sokota
Total
8,043.9
1,459.6
6,584.3
2,849.7
321.2
71.2
120.9
85.6
98.0
25.6
4.9
422.1
27.2
149.5
154.3
34.2
73.2
220.4
313.4
306.1
82.3
239.1
10,893.5
rce: Central Bank of Nigeria. Anllual Report and Statement of Accounts 1983,
p,80,
neloans Increased by 24.9070. By 1982, total ex ernal indebteaness
rose by N4.9 billion showing an incr-eas of 211.7%. This upsurge
as as a result of sharp decline in revenue which induced govern-
ents of the Federation to seek external loans to execute their
eady planned development projects. In 1983 the debt rose to
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NlO.8 billion.
The high· external indebtedness of Nigeria since 1979 has
increased substantially the nation's debt service burden. The debt
ervice ratio increased from an insignificant 0.8070 in 1977 to 1.5%
in 1981, 8.9% in 1982, 17.5% in 1983,25% in 1984 and 45% in
1985. 10 The result of Nigeria's lowered credit worthiness is thal she
now resorts to trading on cash basis internationally or on expensive
confirmed letters of credit. As Professor Nwankwo showed, this
method of trading has high markups in prices as high as 50070 on
products supplied on open accounts basis and 20% on letters of
credit.1! Thus Nigeria's reduced credit worthiness tend to fuel
imported inflation and the shortage of goods since trading on cash
basis would be fruitful if Nigeria has substantial reserves.
A country facing debt servicing difficulties has three broad
choices:
(a) It may cease repayment on its debts thereby accumulating
debt service arrears. This may result to a series of more
problems sinl:c it would undermine confidelKc in the country,
making it difficult for it to borrow. There is also a tendency
for future default in which case that country's assets may be
attacked or confiscated and sold to discharge the debt. This is
the Castro option.
(b) A second option will be for that country to try to service its
debts at all costs, this ~lay lead to restrictions on other foreign
"",:iILlJlgl.: expendilrre~ hence resulting in a redul:tion In
imports. This is the present situation in Nigeria where imports
consists of mere essentials. Factories are closing down, un-
employment figures mounting, prices escalating. Life is
difficult; people qarving and dying of hunger and
frustration. Deb[ service ratio is very high and this situation
cannot persist for long.
(c) Finally a country with d~bt scrvicing problems may seck a
rescheduling which is a re-arrangement of the repayment
terms or it may seek refinancing. In Nigeria's case the I.M.F.
Loan would have refinanced short-term trade debts of N2.6
billion making it possible for rescheduling of medium term
debfs due for payment which amounts to ~O billion.
It is evident that Nigeria needs the l.M.F. loan in order to help
defray outstanding short-term trade arrears and increase her credit
worthiness. Nigeria depends .on trade creditors for both producer
and consumer goods. So far4her industrialization efforts have been
geared to processing foreign raw materials. To do so she acquired
112
capital intensive means of production from El.Irope and America.
In consequence of the reduced credit worthiness, Nigeria can no
longer bring in the goods as before. Industries close down and
unemployment figures go up. Graduates commit suicide ever so
often for being unable to find jobs, and some find themselves sub-
optimally employed as car drivers, all these bf'cause Nigeria cannot
reschedule trade debts and continue trading as before.
It may be argued that Nigeria should seek to be self-reliant and
depend less on the external sector. But this should be a long-run
strategy, planned and implemented by Government. In the interim,
the Nigrian industries would have to be reactivated to ful capacity
operation. The ordinary goods which Nigerians have been buying
based on international division of labour and the theory of com-
parative advantage, since no nation achieve 100010 economic
autarky should be allowed to flow. The absence of these commo-
dities has made Nigeria a very difficult place to live in, because of
unprecedented inflationary costs of acquiring basic commodities.
To take the I.M.F. loan of N2.2 billion means that Nigeria's
trade credit would fall by that amount. Her total indebtedness does
not necessarily increase. It has consequences for possible future
increased indebtedness since she can now carryon trade on credit
basis with her enhanced credit worthiness. This is because con-
clusion of an I.M.F. package is deemed a stamp of approval on a
nat,ion's credit worthiness. Trade creditors prefer to deal with
nations with I.M.F. stabilization programme. This is why the
tM.F. is a necessary party in all rescheduling agreements as the
creditors do DO! !la1/t' In. ma.:l1inery (0 en~E/re (fra.( (fIe cfe6(or
nations have the capacity to meet the terms of agreements.
The Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market and After
Since naira cannot float effectively in the foreign exchange
market as a result of its non-collvertibility and non-trading status,
an alternative is to create a 2nd tier exchange window where the
true value of the naira can cmer~e by the demand and supply of
foreign currency in the mark l. For instance, if five billion Nigerian
naira constitutes effective demand for foreign currency and the
supply is represented comp sitively by say two billion dollars of
foreign exchange then the eXChange value for naira an~dollars
would be 2.5 to I. Since naira is over-valued the true value of naira
would emerge 111 the 2nd tier market.
Nigeria has decided to introduce this 2nd tier window in
Nigeria's foreign exchange market as an alternative to immediate
devaluation of the naira. It is hoped mos official and all private
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transactions would be routed through this market. In effect there
would be two markets for foreign exchange in Nigeria, the 1st tier
which would represent official or historical prices for naira and the
2nd tier which would reflect market prices for the naira.
If well implemented the over-valuation of the naira and its
untoward consequences of balance of payments deficits, black
market transactiollS, smuggling, trafficking in currencies that
tended to reduce the supply of foreign exchange through official
channels would be mitigated if not completely check-mated. It is
hoped that in a matter of time the official rate, the market rate and
the black market rate for the naira would converge at a true market
rate that does not overvalue the naira, a gradual devaluation of the
naira would have been effected. Also foreign exchange rationing
through import licences would be a thing of the past.
Conclusion
Since Nigeria has rejected the I.M.F. loan and since the IMF's
cOi-.cordance and approbation are necessary for Nigeria's external
debt rescheduling, the introduction and operation of the 2nd tier
foreign exchange market would substitute for devaluation. With
this all IMPs conditionalities would have been met and Nigeria can
thus get I.M.F.'s stamp of approval through its enhanced
surveillance scheme for the rescheduling of her medium-term and
long-term debts. ihis is a substitut,e for I.M.F. loan but not a
perfect substitute as Nigeria's short-term obligations would still be
outstanding. In the circumstance this is a second best strategy since
Nigeria lacked the political will to take thc loan.
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